A firm has inventories of a set of components that are used to produce a set of products. There is a finite horizon over which the firm can sell its products. Demand for each product is a stochastic point process with an intensity that is a function of the vector of prices for the products and the time at which these prices are offered. The problem is to price the finished products so as to maximize total expected revenue over the finite sales horizon. An upper bound on the optimal expected revenue is established by analyzing a deterministic version of the problem. The solution to the deterministic problem suggests two heuristics for the stochastic problem that are shown to be asymptotically optimal as the expected sales volume tends to infinity. Several applications of the model to network yield management are given. Numerical examples illustrate both the range of problems that can be modeled under this framework and the effectiveness of the proposed heuristics. The results provide several fundamental insights into the performance of yield management systems. yield management is the practice of using booking policies together with information systems data to increase revenues by intelligently matching capacity with demand. It is now widely practiced in capacity-constrained service industries such as the airlines, hotels, car rentals, and cruise-lines. Historically, yield management started as an operations function, focusing only on capacity allocation given exogenous demand estimates. However, there is a growing consensus among researchers and practitioners alike that the pricing decisions that induce demand cannot be separated from traditional, capacity-oriented yield management decisions; these two decision are inextricably linked. Pricing decisions influence the demand statistics that form the basic inputs to any yield management system, and pricing decisions in turn must ultimately be based on knowledge of the underlying capacity constraints and yield management policies. Therefore, to realize the full benefits of yield management, joint pricing/allocation schemes are necessary.
yield management is the practice of using booking policies together with information systems data to increase revenues by intelligently matching capacity with demand. It is now widely practiced in capacity-constrained service industries such as the airlines, hotels, car rentals, and cruise-lines. Historically, yield management started as an operations function, focusing only on capacity allocation given exogenous demand estimates. However, there is a growing consensus among researchers and practitioners alike that the pricing decisions that induce demand cannot be separated from traditional, capacity-oriented yield management decisions; these two decision are inextricably linked. Pricing decisions influence the demand statistics that form the basic inputs to any yield management system, and pricing decisions in turn must ultimately be based on knowledge of the underlying capacity constraints and yield management policies. Therefore, to realize the full benefits of yield management, joint pricing/allocation schemes are necessary.
While what must be done, namely coordinating pricing and allocation, is clear, exactly how it should be accomplished remains somewhat a mystery. The problem is complicated by the fact that in many applications, most notably the airlines, many markets (origin-destination pairs) compete for the same resources (leg capacities); therefore, the pricing/allocation problem must be solved jointly for a large number of markets and resources. Uncertainty in the demand process and the dynamic nature of the allocation decisions further compound the difficulty of the problem.
MODEL DESCRIPTION AND APPLICATIONS
We propose a dynamic, stochastic model of yield management problems that addresses the joint pricing/allocation decision in a multiple-market, multiple-resource setting. Specifically, we define the problem in terms of products and resources. To provide a unit of product j, j = 1, . .. , n requires aij units of resource i, i = 1,..., m. We define the bill of materials matrix A = [aij]. We assume A is an integer valued matrix. Demand for each product j is modeled as a stochastic point process with intensity AJ. (All vectors are column vectors unless otherwise stated.) The vector of demand intensities A = (A1, . . ., An) at time s, is a function of s and the vector of current prices p = (pt, ... , pn). This demand function need only satisfy some general regularity conditions. Demand for a given product j is allowed to depend on time, the price of product j, and the price of products other than j; however, we do not allow the current demand to be a function of past or future prices. Thus, we assume that customers respond only to current prices and do not act strategically by adjusting their buying behavior in response to the firm's pricing policy. This is certainly a limitation of the model. To consider strategic customer behavior would require a gametheoretic formulation, which, though quite interesting, is beyond the scope of our present analysis.
Given initial quantities of resources at time zero and a time horizon t, the problem is to control prices, perhaps subject to price constraints, in order to maximize expected revenue over the interval [0, t] .
It is perhaps not immediately clear that this formulation is a reasonable model of a yield management problem. In particular, there appear to be no "allocation" decisions. However, one can view allocation, at least conceptually, as a pricing decision. This is true for two reasons. First, if each product has only one fare class associated with it or each fare class is well differentiated in terms of payment requirements, ing to the days Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday of Week 1. Our multiproduct, multiresource formulation naturally captures the inter-day dependencies found in hotel booking.
Our model also applies to situations quite distinct from those of traditional yield management. One example is the style or fashion goods industry. In the fashion industry, contracts for garment production typically are fixed well in advance of a given selling season. During a sales season, retailers face the problem of adjusting prices, usually through periodic sales and/or mark-downs, so as to maximize the total revenue from their initial stock. These problems are often multi-dimensional in nature for two reasons. First, demand for products may be dependent due to the fact that one product may substitute for or complement another. Second, both products and resources may correspond to specific garment types at particular locations (either retail outlets or warehouses). Thus, if transshipments are allowed, the same "product" (garment j at location x) may be provided using one of several "resources" (garment j at another location y).
Other possible applications of the model include production/inventory problems where resources are components that can be assembled into a certain number of available products in a product line. The problem then is to price the product line to maximize the revenue from a given initial stock of components. For example, assembling a line of personal computers which share common components but are subject to rapid obsolescence is one possible application in this category.
In the interest of brevity and to maintain focus, we shall concentrate on airline yield management applications of our model. However, both our model and analysis are indeed quite general and can be used in a wide variety of other applications.
LITERATURE REVIEW
The study of yield management problems in the airlines dates back to the work of Rothstein (1971) for an overbooking model and to Littlewood (1972) for a model of space allocation of a stochastic two-fare, single-leg problem. Belobaba (1987b and proposed and tested a multiple-fare-class extension of Littlewood's rule, which he termed the expected marginal seat revenue (EMSR) heuristic. Extensions and refinements of the multiple-fare-class problem include recent papers by Brumelle and McGill (1993) , Curry (1989) , Robinson (1995) , and Wollmer (1992). The above papers develop optimal rules or heuristics under the assumption that the demand for different fare classes are random variables instead of stochastic processes. Some of the rules developed for random variables have been applied dynamically. See Weatherford et al. (1993) for extensive simulations on the performance of some of these rules under various models of the customer arrival processes. Lee A recent review of research on yield management as well as a comprehensive taxonomy of perishable asset revenue management (PARM) problems is given by Weatherford and Bodily (1992). They identify 14 descriptors that can be used to categorize a range of PARM problems. Our general formulation can model a broad subset of these descriptors, including dynamic pricing and allocation decisions, group demand, diversion, displacement, a timevarying willingness to pay, and no-shows (see Weatherford and Bodily 1992 for a detailed discussion of this taxonomy). In Section 4.3, a variety of examples that illustrate these features are presented. Glover et al. (1982) were, to our knowledge, the first to address a deterministic network flow model for the allocation of seats between passenger itineraries and fare classes. Their formulation, however, does have a restriction to networks with no undirected cycles. In addition to their formulation, Glover et al. give an interesting account of the effects of deregulation. They recognize two components to the airline problem, one tactical and one strategic, with the tactical dealing with monitoring reservations and the strategic consisting of the selection of prices and routes. Wang (1983) provides an algorithm for the sequential allocations of seats on a plane to different uplift-discharge city pairs and fare classes within a flight segment when demands are random. Wang reports a 4% increase in revenue for high load factor flights. In addition, Wang provides a good explanation of the price/market differentiation scheme used by most airlines.
Dror et al. (1988) present a rolling horizon network flow formulation for the seat inventory control problem assuming deterministic demands. Their formulation is extremely complex to account for passengers switching planes at intermediate stops, but allows for arc losses to account for cancellations and no shows. No specification of how to obtain the parameters of the formulation or how to solve the network flow problem is given.
In two internal McDonell Douglas reports, Wollmer (1986a and b) proposes a mathematical programming formulation incorporating random demands, where the objective is to maximize the total expected network revenue. The formulation is very large since there is a variable for each origin/destination, fare class, and seat on each flight leg. On the positive side, the formulation is very accurate.
In her Ph.D. thesis, Williamson (1992) proposes schemes that use well-known leg-based results for solving the network problem. In addition, she uses dual price information to develop a bid-price approach to the network problem. These schemes are extensively tested via simulation.
A traffic flow model of airline networks is proposed by Soumis and Nagurney (1993) . They formulate and analyze a stochastic, multiclass airline network model for determining the equilibrium between the realized demand for different travel routes and the supply of seats. The traffic flows predicted by the model are tested against data from Air Canada.
The most recent reference known to us is due to Talluri (1993) , who formulates a deterministic network model based on origin-destination pairs. His key idea is that passengers may be indifferent between different routes for an origin-destination pair provided they have similar departure and arrival times. Airlines can take advantage of this indifference by intelligently routing passengers through origin-destination pairs. The decision variables of Talluri's model correspond to the allocation of demand for origindestination pairs to routes for which customers are indifferent. When demand is assumed to be stochastic, Talluri provides a deterministic integer-programming formulation based on the idea of maximizing expected marginal revenue. In addition to his formulation, Talluri offers an interesting account of the state of the art of computer reservation systems used to support network models.
Our heuristics are based on deterministic network flow models that are similar in spirit to those of Dror et al., Glover et al., and Talluri. However, the exact relationship of these models to the underlying adaptive stochastic control problem has not been previously addressed. Our results allow us to rigorously analyze this relationship.
OUTLINE AND OVERVIEW OF MAIN RESULTS
We begin by formally stating the formulation and assumptions of our general model in Section 4. We then prove that a deterministic version of the problem provides an upper bound on the revenue of the original stochastic problem. The deterministic solution suggests two possible heuristics, which we call the make-to-stock (MTS) and make-to-order (MTO) heuristic. We show in Section 5 that both heuristics are asymptotically optimal as the volume of expected sales tends to infinity. We extend these results to the case where overbooking and cancellations are allowed in Section 6.
Next, in Section 7 we examine several applications of our results to specific airline yield management problems. These include network, product differentiation, and overbooking problems and problems with time varying demand. We also examine how the lack of price flexibility and misspricing affect revenues and the performance of the various heuristics. Our conclusions and thoughts for further research are presented in Section 8.
ASSUMPTIONS AND FORMULATIONS

Modeling Assumptions
We assume a market with imperfect competition in which demand for each product j = 1, . 
Constraint (2) acts to "turn off" the demand process for a product j when the firm lacks sufficient resources to provide it. Thus as soon as a resource, say i, is exhausted, at time s, the prices of all products j consuming resource i(aj > 0) are increased to pi (s). The existence of a null price pJ (s) for all j at all times s guarantees that (2) can always be satisfied (with probability 1). Finally, we assume that the salvage value of unused resources is zero. We show below that this is assumption is made without loss of generality. Note that pricing policies are nonanticipating in the sense that the price at time s can depend only on s and on the realization of sales up to but not including time s. Also, since we allow policies where the price depends on the actual realization of demand, the price p5 and the corresponding demand intensity As are themselves random vectors. Finally, note that the price vector does not need to be a continuous function of time; it merely needs to be contained in the set 05(s).
Given an initial vector of resource inventories x, a deadline t > 0, and a regular demand process as described above, we want to find a pricing policy in 91 that maximizes total expected revenue. More formally, we denote the expected revenue of policy u by
and the firm's problem is to find a pricing policy u*, if such a policy exits, that maximizes the total expected revenue Discrete Fare Classes. It many cases, firms do not have complete flexibility in setting prices. For example, airlines are often forced to match the fares of competitors or are committed to offering a certain number of advertised promotional fares. As a result, a firm may be restricted to a small number of price points for each product. This means that, on a tactical level, the firm may be able to control only the availability of its various fares, and may not have the freedom to change the fares themselves.
To model this situation, one can consider the set of allowable prices P(s) to be a finite set, reflecting the possible fares that can be offered for each product together with the null prices pi that block demand for product j = 1,..., n. The set A(s) is then a finite set as well. In this case, the decision is which of the discrete set of prices to make available at any point in time for each product. If the null price is offered, then the product is closed, and no sales are made. This type of decision is more in the spirit of traditional yield management problems, in which one controls the availability of various fare classes for a given product. The discrete price formulation creates a technical problem since A(s) is not convex in this case; however, we discuss in Section 4.5 how this restriction can be relaxed if the revenue rate is constant or piecewise constant in time. If the revenue rate is continuously varying in time, it is possible to use randomized rules to overcome the convexity problem.
Optimality Conditions
The formulation ( In general it is very difficult to find closed form solutions to systems of differential equations such as the one presented above. (See Gallego and van Ryzin 1994 for a closed-form solution for a single-product problem with an exponential demand function.) Although some of these systems can be solved numerically, the solutions tend to call for continuous price decreases between sales and for price jumps immediately after each sale. Therefore, we next examine an approach for finding provably good suboptimal pricing policies based on analyzing a deterministic version of this problem.
Formulation of Deterministic Problem
The deterministic problem is defined as follows. At time zero, the firm has a vector of material supplies x, which are continuous quantities, and a line of products j = 1, . . ., n which are sold in continuous amounts. To produce a unit quantity of product j requires quantities aij of each mate- The firm's problem is to maximize the total revenue generated over [0, t] given x, denoted Jd(x, t). 
D1
We are now ready to prove our first theorem. and by definition J*(x, t) = sup Ju(x, t). 
TWO ASYMPTOTICALLY OPTIMAL HEURISTICS
We next examine heuristics suggested by the solution to the deterministic problem. Two implementations of the deterministic solution are considered, a make-to-stock and a make-to-order heuristic. We show both are asymptotically optimal as the expected volume of sales tends to infinity.
The Make-to-Stock Policy
In the deterministic problem, we know with certainty the quantity of each product that will be sold under any given policy. Therefore it is possible to produce products in advance and hold inventories of finished products rather than hold inventories of resources. This suggests the following heuristic:
Make-to-Stock (MTS) Policy. Let Pd(s) be the optimal deterministic price path and Ad(s) be the corresponding optimal deterministic intensity. Define 
Preassemble zJ units of product j = 1, ..., n and place the products in separate inventories. Price products at Pd(s), 0 S s S t and sell them until the product inventories are exhausted or the deadline t is reached, whichever comes first.
Here LxI denotes the largest integer less than or equal to x.
Of course, there is no need to physically preassemble products in this heuristic; we need only logically reserve resources for specific products. Effectively, however, the MTS heuristic takes away both price flexibility and product mix flexibility. Despite this lack of flexibility, the policy performs quite well when the expected number of sales of each product is large. (Computational examples are given in Section 7.)
Before proving this claim, we need a preliminary result. Consider just a single product being sold over [0, t] using a deterministic (scalar) price path Pd(s) and deterministic (scalar) intensity Ad(s). Suppose there is an infinite supply of the product and let R, a random variable, denote the total revenue received by following this optimal deterministic price path. The distribution of R is characterized as follows. Some explanation of this theorem is in order before we present a proof. Here, ui is an upper bound on the price obtained for item j and ai is the quantity of sales under the deterministic policy defined by (9). In the context of the stochastic problem, one can think of this last quantity as the mean number of requests for product j over the interval [0, t] when using the deterministic prices Pd(S). Note that the maximum prices ui must be finite, otherwise this bound is trivial. Theoretically, this is a somewhat a restriction, but it poses no real practical limitation. Provided ui is finite for all products j, the error term tends to zero as the quantities &i increase. Thus, if the expected sales volumes are large, the error term above is small. We give a more precise interpretation of this bound after presenting the proof. where ai is defined as before for the case k = 1. This clearly shows the MTS heuristic is asymptotically optimal as the scale of the problem increases (k -* oo).
The Make-to-Order Policy
An alternative to the MTS policy is to price products according to the deterministic prices pd(s), 0 -s -t and then simply satisfy requests in a first-come-first-serve order. This idea leads to our next policy. Proof. In the MTO heuristic, requests for product j are filled up until the first time the inventory for a resource i drops below aij. Consider a modified system in which we allow inventories of resources to be negative (i.e., backlogging is allowed) but we charge a penalty vi for every unit of resource i that is backlogged at the end of the horizon. We claim the net revenue (revenue minus backlog penalties) collected in this modified system is, pathwise, a lower bound on the revenue of the MTO heuristic.
Make
To see this, consider a request for product j at time s that is rejected under the MTO heuristic because the inventory of some component, call it i, is strictly less than aij. In the MTO heuristic, no revenue is collected and the inventories are left intact. In the modified system, the request is satisfied and revenue p'(s) is collected; however, the backlog of resource i is increased by at least one unit. Thus, the net revenue received from the arrival in the modified system is no more than p1(s) - While the bounds in Theorems 2 and 3 are theoretically satisfying, they are nevertheless quite crude from a practical standpoint. However, in Section 7 we examine some results of numerical experiments that indicate the performance of the heuristics is good, even for instances where sales volumes are moderate.
A MODEL WITH OVERBOOKING AND NO-SHOWS
Because of the possibility of no-shows (customers who reserve a seat but do not show-up at the departure time), most airlines accept reservations in excess of capacity. This, however, can result in flights being overbooked and the possibility of refusing seats to ticketed passengers. When realized demand exceeds capacity, customers typically are serviced by an alternative source (e.g., another flight or a nearby hotel). In addition, they may be compensated for the inconvenience (lunch, cocktails, a free taxi ride) and to restore goodwill (a free flight coupon).
We next extend our model to allow for overbooking and no-shows. We assume that revenues are collected as reservations are made, that customers show up independently of each other just prior to the delivery of service, and that additional capacity can be secured at a given unit cost. Customers who do not show are refunded the price paid minus a fixed plus variable penalty. The problem is to determine the pricing, and overbooking policy that maximizes expected revenue.
We begin by deriving an expression for the expected revenue. Let yi denote the probability that a customer with a reservation for product j shows up; let ci ' 0 denote the fixed fee; and i3i E (0, 1) denote the variable percentage fee charged to a product j customer who does not show up. Thus, if a customer pays p dollars for product j, he/she obtains a refund of p(l -i3') -ci. We assume that the quantity refunded is nonnegative. If necessary, additional components of type i can be secured at a unit cost pi. Given a nonanticipating intensity control policy As =(X, To account for no-shows, let {Zlk; k -1} be a sequence of independent Bernoulli random variables taking value 1 with probability y' and taking value 0 with probability 1 -y'. We assume that these random variables are also independent of the counting processes NJ.
In our model, revenues are collected as reservations are made and later refunded to customers who do not show up. If we disregard the time value of money, the sales revenue net of refunds can be written as > E p'(A jT,n Tk)l(Tjk t)1(Zk = 1). where wi/ = pi max{ajyij: j E Si}. Because the model presented in the previous sections is quite general, there are many problems that one can investigate using it. We have selected only a representative sample, each one chosen to illustrate a specific problem characteristic. In general, one could combine the characteristics of these examples to obtain increasingly realistic formulations. In addition to illustrating model formulations, the examples also provide insights into some fundamental characteristics of yield management problems.
Proof. The expected value of the make-to-order heuristic is given by
Example 1 examines a network problem that is time homogeneous, has no product differentiation and has no constraints on the O-D prices. Example 2 looks at this same network with two well-differentiated fare class products for each O-D pair. In this example, we assume the differentiation is not based on time, so fare class products are sold simultaneously. Finally, Example 3 looks at this same network when overbooking and no-shows are allowed. A common finding in all these cases is that using correctly chosen fixed prices along with a simple allocations scheme like FCFS (the MTO heuristic) is quite close to optimal.
These findings would seem to suggest that current yield management, with its multiple fares and booking limit allocation schemes, is unlikely to be more effective than simple FCFS allocation. However, we next look at several scenarios in which these practices are indeed effective. The first (Example 4) is when, as a matter of practical necessity, fares for each problem instance cannot be set freely, as was assumed in Examples 1-3. The second case (Example 5) is when the demand function changes over time, either due to changes in the perceived value of the products or through time-of-purchase product differentiation. The final case (Example 6) is when products are misspriced. In all these cases, we show that a multiple-price, dynamic-allocation scheme can indeed be quite effective. The examples help explain more precisely much of the phenomenon that yield management systems are exploiting.
Airline Network Pricing Examples
Consider the following network model. A carrier network is described by a directed graph G = (V, E), where V is the set of n cities serviced by the carrier and an edge (i, j) E E represents a scheduled flight on a leg from city i to city j. We let cij denote the capacity of edge (i, j), i.e., the number of seats available on this flight leg. All capacities are defined with respect to a given day t. At each time s, o < s S t, the carrier can set the n(n -1) prices, pt?, for all possible origin-destination pairs i and j, i + j. These
prices induce demand intensities for the various origindestination (O-D) pairs through demand functions A11(p1i).
There is a fixed path (itinerary) viij, indexing a subset of E that forms a directed path from i to j, associated with each O-D pair i, j. We shall index O-D pairs by vr. The objective is to adjust origin-destination prices and allocate leg capacity among the O-D pairs over time in order to maximize the expected revenue received prior to the departure time t.
We note that several generalizations of this formulation are possible. In particular, there is no need to have a unique path connecting each pair of nodes. An arbitrary (or the complete) set of paths between nodes could be offered and priced-either individually or jointly as discussed in Section 4.3. Indeed, the paths for all our examples were in fact selected by solving a problem that initially makes available all possible paths between nodes. For simplicity, however, we assume a unique path connects each pair of nodes.
In our network examples, we use a revenue function that is separable and time homogeneous, Table I are essentially arbitrary and were chosen merely to illustrate the performance of the heuristics; however, it is not hard to see that the revenue of the heuristics is affected only by the deterministic O-D prices and seat allocations, which are shown in the last two columns in Table I . These prices and seat allocations are reasonable approximations of those found in actual airline applications. The deterministic problem was formulated and solved using a nonlinear programming routine. The resulting prices and seat allocations are given in Table I performance over a range of demand volumes, the common value of A0 = 300 in Table I as well as the leg capacities where scaled as shown in Table II . For example, a scale factor of 2 corresponds to leg capacities that are twice those shown in Figure 1 and a value of A0 = 600 rather than 300 for all demand functions in Table I . This scaling does not change the optimal prices shown in Table  I . In practice, such an increase in volume may occur when aggregating the capacity of several flights. Both heuristics were simulated for each instance, and the resulting expected revenue was estimated. All point estimates for expected revenues have a relative error of +1% with 95% confidence. Table II shows both the dollar revenue and the revenue as a percentage of the deterministic upper bound.
The simulation results reveal several interesting insights. First, observe that the revenue from the MTO heuristic dominates that of the MTS heuristic in all cases. Thus, it appears that if prices are set correctly, "protecting" space for specific O-D pairs, as is done in the MTS heuristic, is not effective; the simple FCFS allocation of the MTO heuristic is better. Second, even relative to an optimal policy the performance of MTO is surprisingly good. Indeed, in the original problem (scale factor 1.0), the results show that at most 3.68% (in expectation) additional revenue could possibly be captured by using a scheme more sophisticated than a fixed-price policy based on the deterministic model together with a FCFS allocation (MTO)-and the potential increase could be even less, since this figure is only an upper bound on the optimality gap. Nevertheless, for most commercial airlines a 3-4% potential increase in revenues is a significant amount of money and would likely justify more sophisticated pricing and/or allocation schemes.
One way to capture some of the additional potential expected revenue is to find the fixed prices that maximize the expected revenue subject to a prespecified allocation scheme such as FCFS; see Gallego and van Ryzin for a discussion on optimal fixed prices for the stochastic problem. An alternative way to capture additional second way to capture some of the additional potential expected revenue is to find more sophisticated allocation policies given a fixed pricing policy. 7.1.2. Example 2: Differentiated Network. Suppose a welldifferentiated super-saver and full-coach product exists for each O-D pair of the network from Example 1. For simplicity, we assume that these products are differentiated by travel restrictions, cancellation policies or other mechanisms not related to the time of purchase. (Timedependent restrictions are discussed in Section 7.1.4.) In this way, sales of the two products occur concurrently throughout the time horizon. Sequential sales, as is usually assumed in airline yield management models, or partial overlapping of sales could be modeled by making each product's demand function time dependent.
We model product differentiation using virtual nodes at each city i to represent the demand from each market segment. These virtual nodes are then connected to the physical node i via infinite capacity links. Thus, the virtual nodes "compete" for the same physical capacities on the legs of the network. Figure 2 shows the network of Figure  1 modified using virtual nodes to account for two classes of demand originating at each node. The revenue function is separable and demand functions are the same log-linear form as in Example 1. Data function parameters, itineraries and the optimal deterministic prices and sales are shown in Table III The simulation results for a series of scaled versions of this problem are shown in Table IV . As in Example 1, the Figure 1 . We assume a uniform probability of a customer showing up of y for all O-D pairs. To make comparisons to Example 1 easier, we assume the demand data are those given in Table I except that the common value of A0 = 300 is multiplied by the factor 1/y. In this way the expected demand net of refunds has the same value as in Example 1 for any given set of prices. We further assume that the airline collects no revenue from those customers who do not show up and that the overbooking charges imposed for each leg are the values shown in Table V . These overbooking charges are the penalties/ costs paid when the airline is unable to accommodate a customer. These values are sufficiently large that there is no incentive to have net expected demand exceed leg capacities. Together, these assumptions imply the following implementation of the heuristics. First, the optimal prices in Table I remain the same. For the MTS heuristic, the allocations in Table I are scaled up by a factor 1/,y and reservations are accepted for each itinerary up to this limit. In the MTO heuristic, all reservations are accepted. In either case, each reservation shows up with probability 'y, and any excess demand for leg capacities must be satisfied at the costs shown in Table V. This example was run for a variety of values for y and the results are shown in Table VI . Again, all figures have a relative error of ? 1% at a 95% confidence level. Note that the revenue is only about 2% lower than that in Example 1, except for y = 0.6 where it is about 3% lower. What is rather surprising is that the revenue does not go down appreciably as the probability of showing up decreases; not until y = 0.6 is there a statistically significant drop in revenue.1 Also note that, unlike Examples 1 and 2, the MTS heuristic in this case appears to be slightly better than the MTO heuristic.
We note that scaling up allocations by 1/,y is a common strategy used by many airlines. The use of scaling factors (not necessarily 1/'y) is described in Belobaba (1987a), and its accuracy as an approximation to optimal overbooking levels is discussed at some length in McGill (1989) .
Though this is only one example, it again suggests that a simple deterministic correction, in this case scaling up the allocation limits by 1/'y, is surprisingly effective. The stochastic effects of no-shows appear to produce only a minor drop in revenue. Indeed, for this example one can show that imposing even a modest fee of $25 for not showing up more than compensates for the lost revenue due to overbooking charges. This is due to the fact that, roughly speaking, no-show fees grow linearly with the number of reservations while the overbooking charges grow proportional to the square root of the number of reservations. Thus, for large scale problems, modest no-show fees can effectively offset quite large overbooking charges. Table VII. To solve the deterministic problem, one first computes the intensity that maximizes the revenue rate over each interval. If the resulting intensities are feasible, then they are optimal. Otherwise, the optimal intensities equalize the marginal revenue rates of both time intervals and exhaust the capacity. For this example, the solution to the deterministic problem is given by The columns of Table VIII under the headings MTO, MTS, and BL present the performance of these allocation policies in absolute and relative terms. The first column of Table VIII gives the deterministic upper bound. Notice that all heuristics performed well, with the BL heuristic having a slight advantage. Unlike most of the network examples, it appears that protecting space works better than a FCFS allocation. However, the effect of the allocation scheme is relatively minor (0.6% improvement in BL over MTO), again suggesting that if prices are set correctly, FCFS allocation is still quite good. One mechanism for increasing revenues under such volatile conditions is precisely to offer several prices for each product and then vary the allocation of space to these prices in response to changes in demand. In this way, one retains the advantage of a stable set of prices while achieving some ability to respond to short-term fluctuations in demand; in a sense, varying the allocation provides a means of synthesizing a continuous range of prices from a relatively small set of fare classes.
A simple, deterministic example illustrates this effect. Consider a single leg flight with a capacity of 100 seats that operates once each day of the week. There is a fixed sales horizon t for each day, and without loss of generality, we assume t = 1. Total demand for each day varies and has an exponential form A(p) = A06EO(P/POl). The reference price and elasticity are assumed fixed at po = $300 and e0 = 3, respectively. For simplicity, we assume that the only parameter that varies from one day to the next is AO, the demand at the reference pricepo. Demand during the week is divided into heavy, medium, and light days. On heavy days (Monday and Friday), Ao = 125; on medium days (Tuesday to Thursday), Ao = 50; and on light days (Saturday and Sunday), Ao = 25.
If one had complete flexibility in choosing prices, each type of day could be priced separately, i.e., one would treat each day as an independent instance and apply a different pricing policy to it. We shall call this option the FLEX pricing policy. Table IX shows the optimal prices to charge on each type of day along with the daily and weekly revenues obtained using the FLEX prices. (All revenues in Table IX are based on deterministic models.)
Since offering a separate price for each day of the week may not be feasible in practice, two alternative options are considered: (1) offer only a single fixed price for the entire week (SP policy); and (2) offer two fares (discount and full), again fixed for the entire week, but vary the allocation of seats to these fares on a daily basis. We call this latter option the booking limit (BL) policy.
Of course, we would like to use the best possible implementation of these two policies. For the SP policy, one can show that the best price to offer is $257. For the BL policy, we used the FLEX price for light days ($161) as the discount price, and the FLEX price for heavy days ($322) as the full price. Table X shows the demand if each of these fare levels was used exclusively over the horizon and gives the optimal allocation of seats to these fare classes. (See Gallego and van Ryzin for a detailed discussion of the optimal policy for this type of discrete price problem.) Table IX show the daily and weekly revenues obtained from the optimal implementations of the SP and BL policies. Note that the weekly revenue of the SP policy is substantially less than that obtained from using the FLEX policy. The loss in revenue in this case is about 21%. The BL policy revenue loss relative to the FLEX policy, at about 5%, is significantly less than that for the SP policy. Thus, we see that in this example booking policies truly provide substantial increases in revenue; they allow one to make up approximately half the gap between the revenue of a pure fixed price policy and a completely flexible pricing policy.
This example illustrates how one can use a limited number of price classes together with a dynamic allocation scheme to recapture some of the revenue achievable An upper bound on the revenue under Policy-a is obtained by finding the best allocation of space assuming that demand is deterministic. This calculation yields $90,000 = 450 x $150 + 75 x $300. In contrast, the BL heuristic performs near optimally capturing 98.8% of the deterministic upper bound. This is because, unlike the MTO heuristic, the BL heuristic reserves 75 seats for the high fare, and unlike the MTS heuristic, it makes all the capacity available for sale. The average number of unsold seats was zero under the MTO heuristic, 113 under the MTS heuristic, and 3 under the BL heuristic.
This example illustrates the sensitivity of both the MTO and the MTS heuristics to pricing errors and shows that performance can be improved by protecting space from excess low fare demand. One can show that if the parameters of a(s) are overestimated in this example, the MTO and MTS heuristics are less sensitive to the resulting pricing errors. In this case, higher than optimal prices are charged, and hence low fare sales do not consume space needed for the high fare demand.
CONCLUSIONS
We have shown how a rich class of revenue management problems can be modeled using a single, unified framework. For this large class of problems, our results show that the pricing policies derived from deterministic models are quite close to optimal.
We also showed that when prices are chosen based on these deterministic models, the effect of allocation schemes appears to be relatively minor. These are, in a way, negative results and suggest that yield management is relatively ineffective when pricing decisions are made correctly. In practice, yield management's main benefit may be to compensate for prices that are not optimally matched to demand, rather than to exploit revenue opportunities due to second-order, stochastic effects. In addition, the practice may-and probably does-serve as a simple mechanism for synthesizing a wide variety of prices using only a limited number of relatively stable fare classes. We believe such insights will prove to be quite beneficial in guiding the development of better yield management systems in practice. Further, our bounds provide a means to evaluate the relative benefit of a given system. There are certainly many possible directions for future research in this area. We have focused exclusively on airline applications; no doubt there are other interesting applications, such as the multi-day hotel problem, that could be investigated using a similar approach. A more challenging problem is to try to combine demand function estimation with pricing/allocation decisions. This would reflect the more realistic case where demand functions are not directly observable. Also, understanding the role that competitors play by explicitly modeling their networks and pricing decisions is an important future research topic. ENDNOTE 1. The fact that revenue decreases in y over the range 0.95-0.80 is not statistically significant. Moreover, the MTO heuristic uses integer allocations, which introduces roundoff errors. As a result, changing 'y does not result in an exact proportional change in the allocations, which may also account for some of this slightly unusual revenue behavior.
